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Abstract:
 Structural econometric methods that assume agents have rational expectations are
often criticized.  Yet, little is known about the relative costs and benefits of adopting
alternative empirical strategies.  This paper compares three procedures for inference about a
single structural parameter using data from a laboratory price search experiment.  Our novel
experimental design induces preferences up to the subjective rate of time preference,
leaving unrestricted only this parameter and the decision rule that subjects use in solving
the search task.  We analyze the experimental data under the assumptions of both rational
expectations and heuristic behavior, and we also draw inferences using a simple revealed
preference analysis that does not require strong behavioral assumptions.  We find that the
revealed-preference analysis does not provide much information about the discount rate,
while stronger behavioral assumptions provide sharper and statistically identical inferences
about the population’s discount rate distribution.  However, substantial differences in
inference appear at the individual level.  We compare the individual discount-rate estimates
to an external measure of forward looking behavior obtained for each subject using an
instrument validated in the psychology literature.  The estimates obtained under heuristic
behavior are statistically significantly positively correlated with our external measure of
time preference, while the estimates obtained under rational expectations and the revealed-
preference estimates are not.
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21. Introduction
The latter half of the 20th century saw the emergence of a large literature documenting
apparently “irrational” behavior by subjects in economics and psychology experiments.
This has led theorists, particularly over the last 10 years, to begin to assess the equilibrium
implications of certain types of rule-of-thumb behavior (see, e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg
1993, Krusell and Smith, 1995, or Lettau and Uhlig, 1999).  Interestingly, however, there
has been relatively little effort made by empirical economists to understand whether, as a
practical matter, assuming rational expectations leads to misspecified models that
substantially distort our inferences about important structural parameters.  This paper
investigates the sensitivity of inferences about one such parameter, the subjective rate of
time preference, to the rational expectations assumption.  To this end, we analyze data
obtained from a laboratory price search experiment that provides a novel design for the
elicitation of discount rates.
Rational expectations is the standard assumption in virtually all structural, applied
economic work, and this has generated some criticism.  As Blundell (1994, p. 4) points out,
“structural models are often accused (in many cases quite rightly) of imposing untenable
and unbelievable restrictions on behavior.”  Nevertheless, there seems to be very little
evidence suggesting that the rational expectations assumption has had detrimental effects in
any positive sense.  One paper that uses field data to estimate the structural parameters of a
life-cycle labor supply model with an expectations-robust procedure (Houser, 2000)
obtained results that line up well with what others in that literature had reported based on
rational expectations specifications.
3Unfortunately, in the empirical analysis of field data there arises a fundamental
identification problem, as pointed out by Rust (1994): Individuals’ preferences and their
expectations processes are jointly nonparametrically unidentified.  Loosely speaking, this
means that to learn about preferences one must take a stand on the form of expectations,
while if one wants to learn about expectations, then a stand must be taken on the nature of
preferences.  The advantage to the experimental laboratory is that preferences can be
induced, allowing the experimenter to control the number of free structural parameters and,
consequently, to draw relatively more convincing inferences about the nature of subjects’
expectations processes and decision rules.
This paper reports data from an experiment that induces preferences up to a single
structural parameter:  the rate of time preference.1  We extend price search experiments of
Rapoport and Tversky (1970) and of Seale and Rapoport (1997) by incorporating delayed
payoffs into the experimental design.  By “delayed payoff” we mean that a subject’s
experimental earnings might be paid to them not the day of the experiment but with some
specified delay (in our experiment, after two weeks). The preference for payments at
different dates revealed by the subject during the course of their price search identifies, at
least asymptotically, their discount rate.  By “discount rate” we mean in this paper that
number δ  such that a subject is indifferent between X  dollars in two weeks and Xδ
dollars today. 2,3
                                               
1
 Inferences about discount rates have been drawn in many other experimental studies (see Chesson and
Viscusi, 2000, for a recent contribution and further references). There are also a few recent econometric
studies which estimate discount rates from field data using indirect inference methods (e.g., Samwick, 1998;
Gourinchas and Parker, 2000; and Cagetti, 1999). Warner and Pleeter (2001) estimate discount rates using
data on real choices with large stakes that were generated in a natural experiment.
2
 Our experiment, to be described in detail below, includes only two possible payoff dates: immediate and
delayed by 14 days.  Hence, we do not need to assume that discount rates are constant over time, and our
results are consistent with both exponential and hyperbolic discounting (for a discussion of exponential vs.
4Our analysis of the experimental data compares three approaches to inference about
subjects’ time preference which differ in the maintained assumptions about subjects’
decision rules.  One important assumption that we maintain throughout the analysis is that
subjects are risk neutral.  This assumption is common in the price search literature on which
we build, so using it here allows our results to be more easily compared to the literature.
Moreover, it is difficult to identify risk and intertemporal preferences separately,
particularly with the fairly limited stopping-decision data generated by our experiment.4  Of
course, the assumption of risk neutrality might fail.  Since risk averse subjects should stop
search sooner on average, and since it turns out that more impatient subjects should also
stop search sooner on average, the failure of risk-neutrality would tend to bias downwards
our discount rate estimates.
Our first results derive from a simple revealed preference analysis that is based only
on subjects’ accepted payoffs.  This procedure enables us to establish discount rate bounds
under the weak assumption that subjects prefer higher to lower payoffs (and risk neutrality).
Although this procedure is robust, it ignores all continuation decisions which, in general,
also contain information about discount rates.  In particular, a subject’s stopping rule within
the sequential search task will vary with her rate of time preference, both under rational
                                                                                                                                              
hyperbolic see, inter alia, Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil, 1989; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; and Kirby and
Herrnstein, 1995).
3
 We acknowledge that the discount rates we measure are likely to be context specific (see, e.g., Knetsch,
1999).   For instance, it has been shown that discount rates might vary across tasks (e.g., Thaler, 1981;
Loewenstein, 1988), time horizons (e.g., Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil, 1989), and framing (e.g., Collier and
Williams, 1999). While context specificity does not alter the conclusions about discount rate measurement we
draw in this paper, we caution that our estimates should not be interpreted as reflecting a “deep” preference
parameter that can be applied in the analysis of other intertemporal choice situations.
4
 Both risk aversion and the willingness for intertemporal substitution are generated by decreasing marginal
utility of consumption. While preferences towards risk and intertemporal substitution can conceptually be
disentagled, say using the framework of Kreps and Porteus (1978), it is typically difficult to distinguish these
in practice.
5expectations and under many other decision rules (which we call heuristics in the sequel).
Incorporating stronger behavioral assumptions, therefore, generally allows more precise
inference about rates of time preference, but at the possible cost of bias due to model
misspecification.
Our second set of results stem from the assumption that subjects have rational
expectations.  While there is evidence that people do not behave according to rational
expectations in many dynamic decision tasks (see, e.g., Carbone and Hey, 1997), other
studies have found that behavior in price search tasks is often quite close to optimal (Hey,
1982).  This is an important advantage of our design since, in our view, people likely
behave near optimally in many actual intertemporal (life-cycle) decision problems.
The final set of results we report are based on a relatively more robust approach.  In
this case we specify a set of candidate decision rules, which can include optimal decisions
as well as sophisticated and naive heuristics, and then use a classification procedure to
determine which combination of heuristic and discount rate is most likely for each subject.
This approach implies that we give up both the assumption of rational expectations and the
assumption that all subjects use the same decision rule. The idea of allowing for a broad
class of heuristics in the context of search tasks has been used by, among others, Hey
(1981, 1982, 1987) and Moon and Martin (1990), while the classification procedure we use
is based on a suggestion of El-Gamal and Grether (1995).
We find that inferences about discount rates are substantially sharpened, relative to
the revealed preference analysis, by imposing behavioral restrictions.  We also show that
the data is described less well by rational behavior than by simpler reservation price
heuristics.  The reason is that subjects tend to stop searching sooner, on average, than is
consistent with rational behavior and low rates of time discounting.  At the same time,
6rational behavior under high time discounting is inconsistent with the frequency of delayed
payoffs that are accepted.  It turns out that some of our heuristics accommodate both
relaxed stopping criteria along with little time discounting, and it is these that explain our
data best among the set of heuristics that we consider.  Nevertheless, we find that
inferences about the population’s discount rate distribution are not statistically significantly
different under the rational expectations and heuristic specifications.  The mean and median
from the rational expectations analysis are 0.65 and 0.68, respectively, while under weaker
behavioral assumptions the statistics are both 0.70.
Although aggregate inference seems robust to behavioral specifications, inferences
about an individual’s discount rate can vary substantially across the behavioral
specifications.  We investigate the relationship between our discount rate estimates and an
external measure of the extent to which each subject is forward looking.  This external
measure is their score on the “consideration for future consequences” (CFC) scale, which
was constructed and validated by Strathman et. al., (1994).  Our main finding is that neither
revealed-preference nor rational expectations estimates are significantly correlated with this
measure, while our heuristic-based discount rate estimates and the CFC measure are
statistically significantly positively correlated.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we the introduce
our experimental design. We then present evidence of discounting and derive bounds on
subjective discount rates (Section 3). In sections 4 and 5, we discuss structural inference
about discount rates under rational expectations and under weaker behavioral assumptions,
respectively. In section 6, we discuss differences between the estimates at both the
aggregate and individual levels.  Section 7 concludes.
72. Experimental design
Subjects make decisions in a standard price search problem (with recall) modified to
incorporate delayed payments.5  Each subject’s goal is to purchase a “widget” that they
value at 100 tokens.  The widget is sold at many different locations, and visiting a new
location costs one token.  Each location posts both a price and availability for the widget
that are revealed if the subject visits that location.  Subjects are told that the price at each
location is drawn independently from a normal distribution with mean and standard
deviation of 100 and 10, respectively.  Subjects are also told that the availability at each
location is drawn independently (both across locations and with respect to the price draw)
and is immediate with probability 0.5 or 14 days with probability 0.5.  Subjects may stop
their search at any time and purchase the widget from any of the locations they visited.
This design allows inference about time preference within an environment where
past research has shown behavior to be “near” rational.  Experiments conducted by Hey
(1982, 1987) suggest that search behavior is closer to optimal when there is no recall, and
when subjects have full information about the price distribution. Our design combines the
possibility of recall and the availability of information about the price distribution. We do
this because (1) the possibility of recall together with the time-differentiated availability of
the product (and possibility of a delayed payment of the search surplus) allows us to
observe within-game trade-offs between different points in time, and (2) giving subjects
full knowledge about the price distribution, along with the opportunity to become
experienced with the task, avoids problems arising from “learning” that might distort
inference about time preference.
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 The instructions for the experiment are in the appendix.
8 The perception that delayed payment involves risks or transaction costs can bias
inference about a subject’s rate of time preference.  We made every effort to mitigate this
potential confound.  Subjects were told that at the end of the experiment their earnings
would be put into an envelope.  If they chose an immediate payment then the envelope
would be given to them immediately.  If they chose a delayed payment their envelope
would be stored in a safe until it was delivered or picked up in 14 days.  The instructions
read (see the appendix):  “We absolutely guarantee that 14 days from today you will be able
to obtain your envelope with your earnings.  Moreover, we will pay any costs (such as
mailing costs) required to get your earnings to you after 14 days.”
The experiment was conducted at the University of Arizona’s Economic Science
Laboratory in the Spring and Summer of 2000.  Subjects were recruited from the general
student population.  All experiments were run entirely on computers using Visual Basic
software written by the authors.6
Upon arrival, each subject was given an instruction sheet, a transcript of which is
provided in the Appendix, and seated privately at a computer terminal.  To ensure subjects
were experienced with the task and comfortable with the computer interface, they were
allowed to play an unlimited number of practice games before playing ten games that were
relevant to their final payment. Subjects earned $5 for participating in the experiment (paid
to everybody at the end of the session regardless of their choices) and an additional amount,
possibly time-delayed,  determined by selecting randomly the outcome of one of the ten
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 The software used in the experiment is available on request.
9payment-relevant games.7 Subjects were paid privately at the end of the experiment. On
average, subjects were in the laboratory for about an hour and earned about $20.
Our results are based on the play of 68 subjects.  This yields a total of 680 payoff-
relevant games and a total of 4527 rounds (continuation decisions).  On average, subjects
had played 9.87 practice games before starting their 10 payoff-relevant games. During
practice subjects on average played more rounds per game, accepted higher prices, obtained
lower payoffs, and also obtained zero payoffs more often than in the payment-relevant
games.8
3. Evidence of discounting and bounds on subjective discount rates
Table 1 contains an overview of the intertemporal choices made by subjects. The
top panel contains data for all 680 games. In 371 games, subjects chose a product with
instant delivery (corresponding to an instant payoff), and in 309 games subjects chose a
product with delayed delivery (corresponding to a payoff in 14 days). On average, accepted
prices are higher, and the resulting payoffs lower, for chosen products with instant delivery.
This is consistent with the notion that at least some of our subjects discount future
payments. Discounting is also suggested by Figure 1 which shows the distributions of
accepted prices for both delivery dates.
Our first approach to drawing inferences about subjects’ discount rates, which can
be viewed as revealed intertemporal preference analysis, requires only the assumption that
subjects prefer higher to lower payoffs (and risk neutrality).  With this assumption, we are
able to derive bounds on each subject’s discount rate by observing their location choices.
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 Of course, our analysis is independent of the game selected to determine a subject’s payment.
10
For example, suppose a subject stops searching, and her best payoffs for immediate and
delayed delivery widgets are 88 and 90, respectively.  If the subject chooses the location
that offers immediate delivery, it follows that her discount rate can be no larger than 88/90,
while if she chooses the location offering delayed delivery, her discount rate can be no
smaller than 88/90.  This fact allows us to construct bounds on a subject’s discount rate,
given that the subject has a meaningful choice between delivery dates. In particular, only
those games in which the subject has prices which would result in positive payoffs at both
delivery dates contain information about her discount rate.  This is the case for 604 of the
total 680 games. The bottom panel of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample
that excludes the 76 zero-payoff games from the revealed preference analysis.
Table 2 lists the six situations a subject can face after she decides to stop searching.
These situations are defined by comparing payoffs for the chosen delivery date with the
payoffs corresponding to the best price available at the alternative delivery date (of which
many will be zero as well). Observations for cases 1, 2, and 3 (delivery now) are shown in
the top panel of  Figure 2, observations for cases 4, 5, and 6 (delivery later) are shown the
bottom panel. Observations that correspond to cases 1 and 4 are above the 45 degree line,
observations that correspond to cases 2 and 5 are on the 45 degree line and observations
below the 45 degree line correspond to cases 3 and 6, respectively. Table 2 also contains
the counts of these observations.
From these observed decisions on intertemporal tradeoffs, we can compute bounds
on subjects discount rates. We exclude those cases in which subjects chose combinations of
price and date that were strictly dominated in terms of the associated payoffs (for example,
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 Descriptive statistics for the practice rounds are available on request.
11
all case 4 observations) and all observations with zero payoff for the best available price at
the alternative delivery date.
We end up with observed choices that allow us to obtain lower and/or upper bounds
that lie in the [0, 1] interval only for a subset of individuals.9 For all other subjects, we set
the lower bound to 0 and/or the upper bound to 1. We then compute the “revealed
preference” estimate of the subjective discount rate for all subjects as the mean of the lower
and upper bounds. This procedure can be interpreted as follows. We impose a prior for the
subjective discount rate which is a uniform over the [0, 1] interval. Observed lower and
upper bounds away from zero or one, respectively, allow us to narrow our prior. For those
subjects for whom we cannot construct bounds away from zero and one, we end up with an
estimate of 0.5 (this is the case for 38 subjects, more than half of our 68 subjects).
The distribution of the bounds on subjective discount rates and the estimate of the
subjective discount rate that we obtain are summarized in Table 3. In general, the bounds
on discount rates are relatively wide, and there is a fair amount of heterogeneity in these
bounds; this corresponds to the scattered price observations in Figure 2. Figure 9 shows the
distribution of estimated discount rates (together with estimates obtained using other
behavioral assumptions and procedures, to be discussed in the following sections). It is
evident that the revealed preference approach without stronger behavioral assumptions does
not narrow the flat prior distribution substantially.
The following sections show how imposing additional assumptions on subjects’
behavior allows us to use the information generated in our experiment to obtain better
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 Since all subjects play 10 games, we have more than one lower or upper bound for some subjects. In these
cases, we compute the intra-subject maximum of the lower bound, or the intra-subject minimum of the upper
bound, respectively.
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estimates of the subjective discount rates.  These improvements do not depend on the fact
that we obtain informative bounds on subjective discount rates only for a subset of our
subjects.
4. Inference under rational expectations
The revealed intertemporal preference approach provides only wide bounds on the discount
rate for only about one-third of our subjects.  It is attractive in that it requires very weak
behavioral assumptions, but this also means that only the final decision in each game, the
location decision, can be used for inference about the discount rate.  If one is willing to
make stronger behavioral assumptions, then the continuation decisions generally inform the
discount rate as well.  This is the approach we follow in this and the next sections.
A natural starting point is to assume that subjects follow the rational expectations
stopping rule.  Under this assumption, the subjective discount rate is identified and can be
estimated as the only free parameter of the corresponding decision process (under our
maintained assumption that subjects are risk neutral).  To see this, it is useful to derive the
optimal solution to the search task.  Since the value of the “widget” in the experimental task
is 100 tokens, and since each search costs one token, it is reasonable to derive the solution
to the problem under the restriction that the number of searches cannot exceed 100.  For the
remainder of this paper, we label a subject whose behavior is consistent with this rule as a
“rational expectations” agent.
13
Let {1,2,...,100}t∈  denote the number of searches that the subject has made.10
After making the tht  search the agents’ state vector is 0 1{ , , }b btS t p p=  where 0bp  is the
lowest price the subject has encountered for immediate delivery, and 1bp  is the lowest price
encountered for delayed delivery.  After the tht  search the agent may either stop searching
and choose a location from which to buy the item or continue to search.  If the agent stops
searching then she chooses to buy the item from the location with the highest payoff.  The
available payoffs are:
0 0
1 1
( ) max{0,100 }
( ) max{0, (100 )}
b
t
b
t
S p t
S p tδ
Π = − −
Π = − −
(1)
where δ  is the agent’s rate of time preference.  It is convenient to define the chosen payoff,
conditional on stopping, as 0 1( ) max( ( ), ( )).t t tS S SΠ = Π Π   The agent will stop searching
only if the stopping value is higher than the continuation value.  The recursive formulation
of this decision problem is therefore:
1 1( ) max{ ( ), [ ( ) | ]}t t t t t tV S S E V S S+ += Π (2)
where E  represents the mathematical expectations operator, and this conditional
expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of 1 | .t tS S+
It is immediate from (1) and (2) that this problem has, at every t , the reservation
price property.  That is, there is some price for immediate delivery items, which depends
both on the number of completed searches and the best available price for delayed-delivery
items, such that at this and any lower price it is optimal to stop searching while at every
higher price it is optimal to continue.  Similarly, delayed delivery widgets also have
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 For notational convenience, we suppress a subject index as long as no confusion can arise.
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reservation prices.  To see this, note first that since only one price draw occurs at any
particular location, it is sufficient to show that the reservation property holds for both prices
individually.  This is seen by noting that both arguments that enter the maximization
operator in (2) are weakly decreasing (in both prices), and that when prices are sufficiently
low the continuation value is equal to the stopping payoff less one, while at sufficiently
high prices the stopping payoff is zero while the continuation payoff is necessarily bounded
above zero (since all price draws are independent and the measure of prices that generate
positive payoffs is strictly positive).  The intermediate value theorem then implies that the
stopping and continuation value cross at least once.  That this crossing is unique follows
from the fact that the slope of the stopping payoff at the crossing point must be –1 (since
the crossing occurs at a positive value for the stopping and continuation payoff), and the
slope of the continuation payoff function is evidently bounded from below by –1 (because a
one unit improvement generated by the current price draw can never do better than improve
the continuation payoff by one unit).
From (1) and (2) it is also easily seen that both reservation prices depend on the rate
of time preference, δ .  One way to see this is simply to observe that the continuation value
incorporates both immediate and delayed delivery events, and the value of delayed delivery
clearly depends on the rate of time preference.  Figure 4 plots the path of reservation prices
for the cases 1.0δ =  and 0.1.δ = 11  Note that by “reservation price” we mean that the
subject should stop searching if the price draw is less than or equal to the reservation value,
and that, consistent with our experiment, we report only integer valued prices.
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 Reservation price paths are found by solving the finite-horizon dynamic discrete choice problem implied by
(1) and (2).  We solve this problem numerically using the standard backwards induction algorithm with
software written by the authors in FORTRAN 77.  This software is available on request.
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When the discount rate is unity the problem reduces to standard search with recall
with a single reservation price.  This reservation price begins at 90, decays slowly to about
87 by round 10, reaches 80 by the 19th search and decays at a rate of about one per round
from that point forward. When the discount rate is 0.1, the reservation price for the current
payoff follows roughly the same pattern as the earlier case, but is slightly higher.  The
reason is that the continuation value clearly falls with the discount rate, so the person is
willing to accept smaller stopping payoffs.  Reservation prices for the delayed delivery
follow an inverted U shaped pattern.  The very low initial values arise because the
continuation value incorporates the chance of finding an item for immediate delivery, and
to offset this expected value under heavy time discounting requires very low prices.
With reservation prices in hand, it is a simple matter to estimate the discount rate for
each individual.  Their decision task requires them to decide when to stop searching and,
once stopped, the location from which to purchase the “widget”.  Given any discount rate,
each period each state-contingent continuation decision is either consistent or inconsistent
with the reservation price associated with that discount rate.  When the subject stops
searching and chooses a location that choice is either consistent or inconsistent with the
given discount rate.  Hence, if jT  represents the number of locations searched before the
subject stopped in game ,j  then there are 1 10... 10T T+ + +  payoff-relevant decisions made
by the subject during the course of the experiment.  We associate each subject with the
discount rate that is consistent with the greatest number of those decisions (this procedure is
formalized in the next section).
In this research we consider only 11 discount rate values: {0, 0.1, …, 1.0}. Such a
coarse grid reduces the computational burden, and prior checks confirmed that choices for
most subjects in our sample are not sensitive to small changes in the discount rate.  Figure 5
16
describes our discount rate inferences for each subject.  The solid circle in the figure
represents the point estimate of the discount rate.  For 36 of our subjects the best discount
rate is not unique:  several discount rates explain the subject’s choices equally well.  In
these cases the point estimate is assumed to be the mean of the candidate values, which is
described in the figure by a solid circle in the middle of a line-segment.  The mean of the
estimates is 0.65 and the median is 0.68.
5. Inference under heuristics
An alternative approach is to impose the weaker assumption that a subject’s decision rule is
a member of a finite “candidate” set with known functional forms. This set of decision rules
might (and in our case does) include the optimal rule. The intuition for our approach is as
follows. If the candidate rules in the set generate different state-contingent decisions for at
least one state that occurs with positive probability, then the decision rule used by each
subject is asymptotically identified. Moreover, so long as the choices predicted by the
decision rules also depend on an intertemporal trade-off, it is possible to estimate jointly the
subject’s subjective discount rate and the decision rule she uses.  The advantage of this
procedure is that inference about discount rates is less likely to be biased by
misspecification of the decision rule.
5.1 Specification of the set of admissible heuristics
Following the approach taken in earlier experimental work on behavior in search tasks by
Hey (1982) and Moon and Martin (1990), we base our analysis on a pre-specified set of
17
candidate decision rules.12 We assume in our statistical analysis that subjects use one of
these rules to determine their stopping decision in every round of the search problem,
conditional on observable state variables and unobservable preference parameters (in our
case, these are the discount rate and, possibly, parameters of the decision rules themselves).
We then compare the predictions of each of these rules with actual behavior in the
experiment to determine which rules are consistent with observed behavior. It is of course
possible that, in a given game, observed behavior is consistent with none of these rules or
with more than one rule. We return to this issue below.
The decision rules we consider fall in three broad classes. The first rule is the
solution to the search problem derived under rational expectations (rule 1). The second
class comprises six sophisticated heuristics which reflect some properties of the optimal
solution but are still simple to apply (rules 2 through 7), and the third class consists of 19
naive heuristics which are not directly related to the optimal solution but extremely simple
to apply (rules 8 through 26). Table 4 contains an overview of all 26 rules.
Decision rule 1 is the optimal search rule. Subjects who follow this rule stop
searching if the best available price for delivery now is smaller than the reservation price
for delivery now, or if the best available price for delivery later is smaller than the
reservation price for delivery later. The reservation prices are given by the solution to the
search problem under rational expectations, as discussed in Section 4 above.
The next class of decision rules are sophisticated heuristics; they have the
reservation price property. We have designed these rules to take account of two important
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 While our approach is similar to the work by Hey (1982) and Moon and Martin (1990), there is an
important difference: In their experiments, subjects did not know the distribution of prices. Most of the
heuristics they consider focus on how subjects can learn about the features of the price distribution during
18
determinants of the optimal reservation price, namely, the known standard deviation of the
price distribution and the accumulated search cost. Subjects who use one of these heuristics
stop searching when the best available present-value payment exceeds a certain threshold
level. In the first version (rules 2, 3 and 4), this threshold is a multiple (0.5, 1.0, or 1.5) of
the standard deviation of the price distribution; note that this threshold is constant over
time. In contrast, in the second version we assume that the threshold falls linearly in the
accumulated search cost (rules 5, 6 and 7). In that version, subjects always stop after a
maximum number of searches (since the standard deviation of the price distribution is 10,
this happens in rounds 5, 10, or 15, depending on the threshold parameter).
An intuitive interpretation of these heuristics is that subjects understand that a
“good” realization of the random price process is a price that is well below the mean of the
known distribution, and natural focal points for the distance between a price draw and the
mean of the distribution are multiples of the standard deviation. Following these
sophisticated heuristics does not require solving the underlying dynamic decision problem.
In particular, subjects do not form expectations over future price draws.
Figure 6 compares the reservation prices for various decision rules, discount rates,
and delivery dates. Figure 6a shows reservation prices for items with immediate availability
implied by rules 2 and 5 (i.e., parameter 0.5) and a discount rate of 1.0, to the
corresponding optimal reservation price path.  The path of rule 2 begins above the optimal
path, is about the same at round 5 and then falls and stays below.  Hence, following this
rule would see people either stopping too easily in early rounds or continuing their search
when they should stop in later rounds.  Rule 5, on the other hand, raises the reservation
                                                                                                                                              
their search.  Such decision rules might not be relevant in our set-up where subjects know the distributions of
the stochastic elements of our model.
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price at all search durations.  Under rule 5, searchers stop with any positive payoff
beginning in round 5, while this is not true for the optimal rule until about round 20.  Figure
6b provides a similar comparison for delayed delivery reservation prices under a discount
rate of 0.5. The reservation price rules are qualitatively similar.
Decision rules 8 through 12 have been suggested by Moon and Martin (1990),
following earlier work by Hey (1982). Subjects who follow rules 8, 9, or 10, the one
bounce rule, search at least 2, 3, or 4 rounds, respectively, and then stop as soon as a price
draw results in a present-value payment that is lower than the best payment available from
earlier rounds. Rules 11 and 12 are even simpler – subjects just do a fixed number of
searches (2 or 3, respectively) and then take the best available price. These rules were
designed for an environment with unknown price distributions.
The remaining decision rules are based on winning streaks (rules 13 through 20)
and loosing streaks (rules 21 through 26). Subjects who follow these rules stop searching if
they receive two or three consecutive price draws that are above or below some fixed
threshold level. Both winning and loosing streak heuristics are formulated in two versions
that differ in how these threshold levels are constructed. The first version is based on the
price draws themselves while the second version is based on the present-value payments
implied by the current price draw. The threshold levels are, once again, formulated as
multiples (0.5 or 1.0) of the standard distribution which we interpret as focal points; details
can be found in Table 4.13 All rules based on winning or loosing streaks take into account
knowledge of the price distribution – the idea is that subjects use the standard deviation to
                                               
13
 Since we do not allow for negative payments, zero is the one natural cut-off point in the payment version of
for the loosing streak heuristic (rules  25 and 26).
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determine what a “good” or a “bad” draw is. However, subjects who follow these rules
falsely assume, at least implicitly, that there is some dependence in the price process.
5.2 Statistical classification procedure
One approach to drawing joint inferences about preferences and heuristics is to determine,
for each subject, the number of choices consistent with each possible heuristic-discount rate
combination, and then choose that which fits the subject’s behavior best.  The drawback to
this procedure is that it can lead to overfitting.  An alternative approach, the one that we
pursue in this section, is to assign the heuristics from a subset of the universe of possible
heuristics, and allow this subset also to be determined by the statistical procedure.  To
determine jointly the “best” heuristic subset and each subject’s heuristic/discount rate
assignment we nest the maximum likelihood classification algorithm proposed by El-
Gamal and Grether (1995) within a discount rate grid search.
To implement the El-Gamal and Grether (1995) procedure we assume that each of
our subjects follows exactly one of the heuristics in our universe of heuristics, and that they
use the same heuristic within each game that they play.14  This seems reasonable in view of
the fact that all subjects are experienced when they begin the payoff relevant games.  Of
course, a subject’s behavior need not necessarily be perfectly consistent with any of the
heuristics in our universe of alternatives.  Following El-Gamal and Grether (1995), we
circumvent this problem by assuming that subjects play their heuristic with error, and that
the error rate ε  is the same across all subjects.15
                                               
14
 Not all expectations-robust procedures require pre-specifying the universe of alternative decision rules.
See, e.g., Geweke and Keane (1999) or Geweke, Houser and Keane (2001).
15
 Rust (1987) contains a discussion of the necessity to include, and alternative interpretations of, such an
error term in structural econometric models with discrete decisions.
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Each of the heuristic/discount rate combinations we consider provides a unique map
from a subject’s state tS  to their continuation decision.  Let ( )ctx δ  be an indicator variable
that takes value one if the subject’s tht  continuation decision agrees with heuristic c under
discount rate ,δ  and is zero otherwise.  We assume that each continuation decision is made
independently with error rate .ε   No difficulty arises if an error leads a subject to continue
their search when they should have stopped, since the subject’s state and corresponding
continuation decision remain defined.  It is, therefore, not inconsistent to assume that a
subject who violates her decision rule in one period can still act according to this rule
during the remaining search periods.  Finally, the last decision that a subject makes in every
game is the location decision.  We assume that the location decision is made independently
of the continuation decisions and with the same error rate.16
Following El-Gamal and Grether (1995), let ( ) ( )1{ ,..., }c cTx xδ δ  be the vector that
summarizes the consistency of the subject’s choices with ( ),c δ  and define a sufficient
statistic, ( ) ( ).c ct t
t
X xδ δ= ∑   Then the likelihood function is
 
( ) ( )( ), ( ) ( )
1( ,..., ) (1 / 2) ( / 2) .
c cc c c X T X
Tf x x
δ δδ ε δ δ ε ε −= − (3)
If there are I subjects, each indexed by ,i  then a natural way to estimate jointly the discount
rate for each subject and their heuristic ic  is to solve:
( ), ( ) ( )
{ , } 1
1,
max ( ,..., )i i i i i i
i i i I
c c c
c i iT
i I
f x xδ ε δ δδ ∈
=
∏ (4)
where the domains for both the discount rates and heuristics are finite and prespecified.
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 We assume that a subject who stops with J location alternatives chooses the “right” location with
probability (1 )ε−  and a member of the set of “wrong” locations with probability ,ε   independent of J.
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To avoid overfitting El-Gamal and Grether (1995) suggest penalizing the likelihood
for each additional heuristic that is included in the set of candidate heuristics.  In this
research we adopt their suggestion exactly, which generates the following penalized log-
likelihood function (for details see El-Gamal and Grether, 1995, p. 1140-1141).
( ), ( ) ( )
{ , } 1
1,
log( max ( ,..., )) log(2) 68log( ) log(26)i i i i i i
i i i I
c c c
c i iT
i I
f x x k k kδ ε δ δδ ∈
=
− − −∏   (5)
Here, k  is the number of heuristics in the candidate set.  Expression (5) is maximized over
the set of all possible k-tuples (k=1,…,26) that can be formed from our universe of 26
decision rules. 17
It is worthwhile to point out that an alternative approach for classifying subjects
according to their decision rules is based on the EM algorithm (for an application in this
context, see Little and Rubin, 1983). As discussed by El-Gamal and Grether (1995, section
6), using an EM classification algorithm has two advantages over our approach. First, since
we classify each subject to the rule that maximizes their contribution to the likelihood
function, we are in essence minimizing the number of errors attributed to each subject. This
results in a downward bias in our estimate of the error rate. Second, small-sample
misclassification errors are not taken into account when we estimate the discount rate.
However, as the number of observations per subjects tends to infinity, both estimation
algorithms will coincide with probability one and share the same consistency properties
(El-Gamal and Grether, 1995, p. 1144).
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 Let kC  denote a set of k heuristics.  El-Gamal and Grether (1995) show the penalized log likelihood (5) is
the Bayesian posterior that arises under the priors that (i) the probability that the population includes exactly k
heuristics is 1/2k , (ii) all possible k-tuples of heuristics in any kC  are equally likely (in our case each has
probability 1/26k), (iii) all allocations of heuristics to subjects are equally likely (in our case each has
probability 1/k68) and (iv) all error rates (between zero and one) are equally likely and do not depend on the
number of rules used in the population or on the way those rules are assigned.
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5.3  Inference about discount rates
Table 5 reports the aggregate fraction of choices that are consistent with each heuristic for
each discount rate in {0, 0.1, …, 1.0}.  The numbers of the heuristics are defined in Table
4.  Heuristics 13 through 26 are streak-based and provide a relatively poor and relatively
discount-rate insensitive fit.  The worst fits are provided by heuristics 22 through 26, the
bounce and fixed search heuristics.  Recall that the latter heuristics have been designed for
search tasks in which the distribution of prices is unknown, so it is not surprising that in our
experiment, they are dominated by heuristics which account for knowledge of the price
distribution.  The best aggregate fits are provided by the six reservation price heuristics
(rules 2 through 6) and the optimal, rational expectations behavior (rule 1).  That the
optimal rule is consistent with up to 88% of all choices is consistent with others’ findings
that behavior is often near optimal in search experiments.
Although behavior is near optimal, it is clear that the reservation price heuristics
provide a superior aggregate fit.  Heuristic 5, whose reservation price profiles are plotted in
figure 6, matches 96% of all choices made in the experiment when the discount rate is
above 0.6.  Note also that while aggregate consistency tends to be higher at higher discount
rates for the reservation price heuristics, it is highest for the optimal rule when the discount
rate is 0.6.  This suggests that subjects are, on average, stopping to search sooner than is
consistent with rational behavior at high discount rates.18  While reducing the discount rate
helps to fit stopping decisions when a current payoff is chosen, it becomes inconsistent with
the decision to accept a delayed payoff.  A relaxed stopping criterion along with a high
                                               
18
 This is in fact the case.  Simulations under rational expectations restrictions, as described in section 6.1,
reveal that the mean length of optimal search is about 11, while the subjects in our sample stopped after about
seven searches on average.
24
discount rate, which reconciles the decision to accept delayed payoffs, is consistent with
our reservation price heuristics.
Table 5 also reports the number of subjects whose behavior is best explained by the
heuristic.  These counts appear in parentheses next to the heuristic number, unless the
heuristic was not assigned to any subject.  Five heuristics appear in subjects’ “best” sets: 1,
2, 5, 6 and 7.  The reason the number of heuristic assignments exceeds the number of
subjects is that, for 24 subjects, multiple heuristics are able to explain their behavior equally
and maximally well (in other words, the likelihood function is flat with respect to some
decision rules).  Heuristics 2, 5 and 6 occur most frequently:  at least one of these heuristics
appears in all but two subjects’ “best” sets.  Two subjects’ choices are uniquely best
explained by heuristic 7.  The rational expectations rule is assigned to five subjects, but
always in conjunction with a sophisticated heuristic. This last finding has an interesting
interpretation. Even though observed behavior is consistent with optimal, rational
expectations behavior in five cases, it is also consistent with behavior that follows some
heuristic that is much easier to use. This finding is consistent with earlier studies which
found that in search experiments, observed behavior is often close to optimal behavior (as
discussed in the introduction).
Figure 7 summarizes the outcome of the El-Gamal and Grether procedure when
applied to our data.  Each dot corresponds to a single subject.  The label above the dot
reports the heuristic to which the subject was assigned.  In 19 cases there are multiple
assignments.  For example, “256” indicates that the subject’s behavior is equally well
explained, at potentially different discount rates, by heuristics 2, 5 and 6.  Note that only
these three heuristics survive the selection procedure.  The vertical position of each dot
measures the fraction of choices consistent with that heuristic at an optimal discount rate,
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and that this number is not less than 92% for any subject, and for several subjects all of
their choices are predicted by their assigned decision rule(s).
Inferences about the subjective discount rates are provided in Figure 8.  In the cases
where multiple heuristics are assigned, the line extends from the lowest to highest discount
rate among all of those in the optimal set.  For example, if a subject’s behavior is
maximally consistent with rule 5 at discount rates .8 and .9, and also maximally consistent
with rule 6 at discount rates .6 and .7, then the line would extend from 0.6 to 0.9.  In
relation to the inferences drawn from the rational case, discount rates are slightly higher on
average and clearly less precise.  One reason for the reduced precision is that, since there is
no continuation value incorporated into the reservation prices, variation in the discount rate
only affects the reservation price path for delayed payment items.  Hence, changes in the
discount rate have relatively fewer behavioral implications, and therefore carry less
information, than in the rational case.
The mean estimated discount rate, where for each subject the estimate is the
midpoint of the interval of possible discount rates, is 0.70 (se=0.03) in the present case as
compared to the value of 0.65 (se=0.04) found in the rational case.  The median is 0.70
which compares well with the median of 0.68 obtained by assuming rational expectations.
The densities of discount rates estimated under rational expectations restrictions and under
the weaker heuristics and revealed-preference assumptions are compared in Figure 9.  The
density in the heuristics case is tighter, with less mass at both extremes of the distribution.
At the individual level, the point estimate of the discount rate changes for 56 of 68
subjects when we give up rational expectations restrictions in favor of heuristics.  It is
larger under heuristics for 29 subjects, with an average increase of 0.30, and smaller under
heuristic for 27 subjects, with an average decrease of 0.19.  The largest increase in the
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estimated discount rate is 0.75 (from 0 under optimal behavior to 0.75), and the largest
decrease is 0.45 (from 1 to 0.55).    
6. Effect of behavioral assumptions at the aggregate and individual level
6.1 Effects on inference about aggregates
An important goal of structural inference is often to learn about the central tendency of the
population distribution of some parameter of interest.  Figure 9 compares the estimated
discount rate distribution that arises under our three models.  The means of the rational
expectations and heuristic distributions are 0.65 (se=0.04) and 0.70 (se=0.03), respectively,
and it turns out that these are not statistically significantly different.  The medians are also
not statistically significantly different, and it turns out that the estimates’ distributions are
not statistically significantly different.19  The mean of the revealed preference estimates,
0.59 (se=0.2), is not statistically different from the mean of the rational expectations
discount rate distribution.  However, the median (0.50) and overall distribution both differ
significantly from the others.20
If one is interested in the central tendency of the discount rate distribution, then our
findings suggest that there is little cost to imposing rational expectations instead of using a
more robust, but in our case cumbersome, heuristics approach.  Often, however, an
important additional goal of structural estimation is “policy analysis” that depends on
                                               
19
 A two-sample, two-tailed t-test for equality of means cannot reject the null that the means of the
distributions are the same at standard significance levels (p=0.26).  A two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test
cannot reject the null that the medians of the two distributions are the same (p=0.54).  A Kolomogorov-
Smirnov test for equality of the distribution functions cannot reject the null that they are the same at the 5%
significance level (p=0.07).
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functions of the structural parameters.  To address this we examine how inferences about
the price elasticity of demand for immediately available widgets compares under rational
expectations and heuristic decision rules.21
We begin by simulating the “baseline” quantity demanded under the restriction of
rational expectations.  Given a discount rate, simulated search proceeds sequentially with
price and availability draws made according to the distributions used in our experiment.
Rational expectations is imposed by (a) using the rational expectations stopping rules and
(b) weighting discount rates according to their rational expectations density as described in
Figure 9. The “high-price” simulation proceeds identically to the baseline except that the
location of the price distribution for immediately available widgets only is shifted to the
right by one unit, becoming N(101,100), and the rational expectations decision rule is
accordingly recalculated for every discount rate.  Then, the rational expectations price
elasticity is determined by comparing the quantity of immediately available widgets
purchased in the two simulations in the usual way.  The price elasticity under weaker
behavioral assumptions is computed analogously, with discount rates and heuristics
weighted according to their in-sample estimated distribution.22 Hence, to compute the
desired elasticities we need to obtain four measures of quantity demanded, and to obtain
each we conducted 68,000 separate simulations. Specifically, we have 68 discount rate-
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 The p-values associated with the t-test, rank-sum test and Kolomogorov-Smirnov test are, respectively,
0.17, 0.01 and 0.0 against the rational expectations distribution, and 0.0, 0.0 and 0.0 against the heuristic
distribution.
21
 Since there are only two products, our analysis also describes the price elasticity of demand for delayed
delivery widgets.
22
 In cases where multiple heuristics were assigned to the same subject, our simulations chose one of the
candidates arbitrarily.  A total of 16 subjects were assigned to heuristic two, and 31 and 21 to heuristics five
and six, respectively.
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heuristic joint assignments.  We simulated under each of these joint assignments 1000
times.
Under the rational expectations baseline, the immediately available widget accounts
for 60% of all purchases in simulations with non-zero payoffs.   This is higher than the 54%
found in the experimental data (see Table 1).  Under the high-price simulation the
immediately available widgets are purchased only 55% of the time, suggesting a price
elasticity of about eight. Under the heuristics baseline it turns out that 53% of the widgets
purchased in games with non-zero payoffs are of immediate availability, and that this
number falls to about 49% under the high-price simulation, implying a price elasticity of
just over seven.
These calculations ignore games with zero payoffs.  It is interesting to note that in
the data 11% of the games resulted in zero payoffs, while in the heuristic and rational
expectations simulations the numbers are 7% and 18%, respectively.23  If one includes half
of the zero payoff games in both the immediate and delayed delivery categories, then the
RE elasticity estimate becomes 6.4 while the heuristic elasticity changes to 7.0.  Taken
together, these results seem to suggest that, at least in our case, elasticity estimates are not
very sensitive to the rational expectations assumption.
6.2 Validity at the individual level
Although the distributions of the discount rate estimates seem rather robust, we pointed at
the end of section 5 that inference about a given individual’s discount rate often varies
substantially with behavioral assumptions.  In many cases, including those where interest
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 The overall average payoff from RE simulations, under the heuristic discount rate distribution and
including zero payoff games, is 1.3% higher than the overall average payoff from the heuristic simulations.
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centers on only a subset of the sample, it is important to have confidence in individual
estimates.  In this section we show that, in some sense, the estimates under heuristics have
greater external validity at the individual level than those under rational expectations or
revealed preference.  Our approach to measuring external validity involves comparing the
estimated discount rates with an independent survey-based measure of the extent to which
one considers future consequences when making decisions.24
Immediately following the experiment all subjects were asked to answer a
questionnaire which contained a set of 12 questions. This repertoire has been developed as
part of a study of personality traits by Strathman et al. (1994). Based on these 12 items,
Strathman et al. constructed and validated a scale which they labeled consideration for
future consequences (CFC). The same questions were used by Daniel and Webley (1997) in
their mail survey on savings attitudes.  They argue that an individual’s consideration of
future consequences should be related to her intertemporal choice behavior.  Daniel and
Webley report positive correlations of the CFC measure with age, with saving (controlling
for age), and also with other psychological constructs related to intertemporal preferences.
Based the answers to the 12 questionnaire items, we constructed the CFC measure
for the 67 subjects who completed the survey.25 Using standard factor analysis methods, we
obtained a scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) of 0.765. Table 7 reports the
correlations of the CFC measure with our three measures of the subjective discount rate
(i.e., revealed preference, optimal behavior, and heuristics estimates) and the correlations
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 Relating observed economic behavior to personality traits documented by psychologists is increasingly
common (see, e.g., Kurzban and Houser (2000)).  With respect to intertemporal choice, Daniel and Webley
(1997) and Donkers and van Soest (1999) have correlated psychological measures of personality traits with
individuals’ savings decisions (both measured using household survey data).
25
 One of our 68 subjects did not complete the questionnaire.
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among the discount rates estimates.26 The strongest correlation is between the two discount
rate estimates obtained under relatively strong behavioral assumptions. The correlations of
these two estimates with the revealed-preference estimates are much weaker. The estimated
correlations between the CFC measure and the discount rates under revealed-preference,
rational expectations and heuristics are –0.07, 0.03 and 0.18, respectively.  The CFC
measure is not statistically significantly correlated with either the rational expectations or
revealed preference discount rate estimates.  However, the null hypothesis that there is no
correlation between the CFC measure and the discount rates under heuristics is rejected (p
= 0.042).  While other psychological surveys might produce different results, our results
suggest one externally validated dimension in which the most reasonable discount rate
estimates are those implied by the heuristics model, and these coincide with the decision
rules that provide the best fit according to our statistical classification procedure.
7. Conclusions
This research aimed to assess the impact of assuming rational expectations on inference
about preferences within the context of a price search experiment.  Our novel experimental
design induced preferences up to a single free structural parameter:  the rate of time
preference.  We drew inferences about this parameter under the assumption that subjects
behaved according to rational expectations and under weaker behavioral assumptions.  We
found that inferences about the discount rate distribution seem to be rather robust to
behavioral assumptions.  In particular, the discount rate distributions implied by rational
expectations and heuristic behavior are not statistically significantly different.  On the other
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 We report Kendall’s tau, a rank correlation measure that is more robust than ordinary correlations, given
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hand, greater differences exist between the distribution implied by a revealed preference
analysis and the other two cases.  The reason is that our revealed preference analysis was
not informative with respect to discount rates.
Although the rational expectations and heuristics discount rate distributions agreed,
we showed that inference at the individual level differed substantially between the two
cases.  One approach to assessing which set of estimates is “better” is to compare each with
an external measure of forward looking behavior.  We did this, using as our external
measure the outcome of a personality survey that has been previously validated in the
psychology literature.  We found that the distribution implied by heuristics behavior is
statistically significantly positively correlated with the external measure, while the other
two distributions are not.
Rational expectations has been criticized as a modeling assumption primarily
because it seems unlikely that people actually perform rational expectations calculations
when making decisions.  While decades of experimental studies support this contention, it
does not follow that rational expectations is an improper assumption even if subject’s don’t
behave rationally.  More robust behavioral specifications can be cumbersome to estimate
and difficult to interpret, and such costs must be carefully balanced against the expected
benefits of more robust specifications.  This research suggests that the benefits lie primarily
in improved individual-level inference.
                                                                                                                                              
that our discount rate estimates take on only few values. We have also computed ordinary correlations, and
they are similar in magnitude.
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Appendix: Transcript of instructions for the experiment
WELCOME
This is a study of individual decision making for which you will earn cash.  The amount of money you earn depends on your decisions,
so it is important to read and understand these instructions.  All the money that you earn will be awarded to you in cash and paid to you
privately.   The funding for this experiment has been provided by a research foundation.
GENERAL OVERVIEW
Your goal is to purchase a “widget”.  This widget is sold at many different locations.  Different locations sell the widget for different
prices and might have different delivery schedules.  At some locations the widget might be available today, while at other locations you
may have to wait some time before the widget is delivered to you.  In order to determine the price and availability at a location you must
pay a “search” cost.  You may search as many locations as you like, and when you are finished searching you may purchase the widget
from any location that you have visited.  Your total earnings are equal to your value for the widget minus the price you pay minus the
total of the search costs you incurred.
VALUES, PRICES AND AVAILABILITY
Your goal is to purchase an widget that has a value to you of 100 tokens.  This widget is sold at many different locations.  Different
locations sell the widget for different prices and have different availabilities for the widget.  It costs you one (1) token to visit a new
location and determine the price it charges for widgets and whether widgets are available.
The price and availability at each location are determined randomly by the computer.  The price at any location is drawn from a Normal
distribution with mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 10.  This means that half of the locations charge a price that is greater than
100 (your value for the widget)  and that about 95% of all prices are between 80 and 120.
A location’s availability for the widget has nothing to do with the price they charge for the widget.  Each location’s availability is either
now or in 14 days with equal chance.  This means that half of the locations offer immediate availability, and the other half offer delivery
in 14 days, and their availability has nothing to do with their price.
YOUR SPECIFIC TASK AND HOW EARNINGS ARE DETERMINED
Your goal is to purchase a widget that has a value to you of 100 tokens.  This widget is sold at many different locations.  Different
locations sell the widget for different prices and have different availabilities for the widget.  It costs you one (1) token to visit a new
location and determine its price and availability for the widget.
You may visit as many locations as you like, paying one (1) token for each location.  When you are done searching you will be given the
opportunity to purchase the widget from any of the locations that you have visited.  Your total token earnings are equal to your value for
the widget (100) minus the price that you choose to pay minus your total search costs.  These tokens are available either today or in 14
days, depending on the availability at the location where you purchased the widget.
EXAMPLE 1:  Suppose you search three (3) locations and decide to buy the widget for 80 tokens at a location with
availability 14 days.  Then your total earnings are:  100 – 80 – 3 = 17 tokens in 14 days.
EXAMPLE 2:  Suppose you search 12 locations and decide to buy the widget for 90 tokens at a location with immediate
availability.  Then your total earnings are:  100 – 90 – 12 < 0 tokens immediately.  However, you never earn less than zero
tokens!  So in this sort of case your earnings will be set to exactly zero tokens.
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You will complete ten “money” rounds of this task.  The number of tokens that you earn and the availability of those tokens for each
round will be recorded on your computer screen.  When you have finished the 10 money rounds exactly one of them will be selected at
random to be the “payoff” round.  For this round only, the number of tokens that you earned will be converted to dollars at a rate of one
token = one U.S. dollar.  These dollars will be paid to you either today or in 14 days, depending on the availability of the widget in the
“payoff” round.
  All of the tokens in the remaining rounds become valueless.
EXAMPLE 3.  Suppose that the situation described in EXAMPLE 1 is chosen as the “payoff” round.  This means that you
have earned $17 and that these $17 will be paid to you in 14 days.
PAYOFFS 14 DAYS FROM NOW
You have earned $5 by participating, and this will be paid to you in cash before you leave today.  The remainder of your earnings will be
paid to you today or in 14 days, depending on your choices.  Before you begin the experiment you will be asked to address an envelope to
yourself.  Before you leave today all of your earnings will be placed in that envelope.  If you are to be paid today, then the envelope will
be given to you today.  If you are to be paid in 14 days then we will mail the sealed envelope to you 14 days from now, or you can pick it
up at your convenience 14 days from now.  Between the time you leave today and 14 days from now your envelope will be stored in a
safe at the University of Arizona.  It will not be touched.  We absolutely guarantee that 14 days from today you will be able to obtain
your envelope with your earnings.  Moreover, we will pay any costs (such as mailing costs) required to get your earnings to you after 14
days.
TODAY’S PROCEDURE
You may practice as much as you like.  You should practice until you develop a good “feel” for the way the task works and become
comfortable with the computer interface.  When you are finished practicing press the “Play for Money” button which appears on the
bottom left corner of your screen.  You will then play 10 times in a row for money.  You will draw a playing card (Ace through 10) to
determine which money round becomes the payoff round.  The amount of your dollar payoff, as well as its timing, will then be
determined as described above.
We are interested in the decisions you make while working alone.  Please, no talking.  If you have any questions please raise your hand.
When you are finished please raise your hand and someone will assist you.
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Table 1: Accepted prices and resulting payoffs
Delivery date of the chosen product
Now Later
Including games with zero payoff
Number of games (680 total) 371 309
Accepted price 86.329 (6.514) 85.350 (5.639)
Resulting payoff 9.199 (6.517) 9.731 (6.252)
Excluding games with zero payoff
Number of games (604 total) 329 275
Accepted price 85.228 (5.457) 84.705 (5.175)
Resulting payoff 10.374 (5.974) 10.935 (5.554)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 2: Combinations of payoffs for accepted and best alternative prices
Delivery date of the chosen productThe payoff associated with
the best price available for a
product with the alternative
delivery date is ... Now Later
... higher than the payoff for
the chosen product
Case 1
109 games
Case 4
92 games
... equal to the payoff for the
chosen product
Case 2
 3 games
Case 5
4 games
... less than the payoff for the
chosen product
Case 3
217 games
Case 6
179 games
Note: Figures exclude games with zero payoff.
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Table 3: Alternative estimates of subjective discount rates
Behavioral assumption Mean Min Max Std. dev.
No restriction (revealed preference)
Lower bound 0.222 0 1 0.307
Upper bound 0.967 0.250 1 0.148
Mean of bounds 0.595 0.125 1 0.181
Optimal behavior 0.635 0 1 0.334
Assigned heuristic 0.704 0 1 0.222
Notes: The total number of subjects is 68.
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Table 4: Candidate decision rules for the sequential search problem
Number Description
Decision rule
is a function
of delta
Parameter
values
1 Optimal search
Stop searching when the best available price for delivery now is
lower than the reservation price for delivery now, or when the best
available price for delivery later is lower than the reservation price
for delivery later.
yes -
2, 3, 4 Reservation price heuristic (version 1)
Stop searching when the best available payoff exceeds γ times the
standard deviation of the price distribution.
yes γ = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5
5, 6, 7 Reservation price heuristic (version 2)
Stop searching when the best available payoff exceeds γ times the
standard deviation of the price distribution less the accumulated
search cost.
yes γ = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5
8, 9, 10 One bounce heuristic
Search at least γ rounds and then stop as soon as a price draw would
result in a present-value payment that is lower than the best payment
available from earlier rounds.
yes γ = 2, 3, 4
11, 12 Fixed number of searches heuristic
Stop searching after γ rounds.
no γ = 2, 3
13, 14,
15, 16
Winning streak heuristic (price version)
Stop if you receive more than γ1 consecutive price draws below E(p)
- γ2σ(p).
no γ1 = 2, 3
γ2 = 0.5, 1.0
17, 18,
19, 20
Winning streak heuristic (payoff version)
Stop if you receive more than γ1 consecutive price draws that would
result in a payment over γ2σ(p).
yes γ1 = 2, 3
γ2 = 0.5, 1.0
21, 22,
23, 24
Loosing streak heuristic (price version)
Stop if you receive more than γ1 consecutive price  draws above E(p)
+ γ2σ(p).
no γ1 = 2, 3
γ2 = 0.5, 1.0
25, 26 Loosing streak heuristic (payoff version)
Stop if you receive more than γ consecutive price draws that would
result in a zero payment.
yes γ = 2, 3
Notes: We assume that after stopping according to one of these decision rules, subjects
accept the price that results in the best present-value payment.
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Table 5: Fraction of correctly explained choices, by discount rate (means across subjects)
assumed value of the discount rate
Heuristic* 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0
1  (5) 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
2  (21) 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.89
3 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.86
4 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84
5  (46) 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.92
6  (29) 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.89
7  (4) 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
8 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.50 0.58
9 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.55 0.62
10 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.58 0.65
11 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39
12 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
13 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81
14 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81
15 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82
16 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82
17 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82
18 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82
19 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82
20 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82
21 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
22 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
23 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81
24 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81
25 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
26 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
* Numbers in parentheses indicates the number of subjects for whom the heuristic is a
“best” heuristic.  No number indicates the heuristic is not assigned to any subject.
The sum of the assignments is greater than the number of subjects because some
subjects are assigned multiple heuristics.
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Table 6: Correlations of the CFC scale and three discount rate estimates
CFC scale
Revealed
preference
Rational
expectations
Revealed preference -0.0699
Rational expectations search 0.0294 0.1624*
Heuristics-based search 0.1787** 0.2696*** 0.3250***
Notes: The table reports are Kendall’s robust correlation coefficients. *, ** and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Figure 1: Distribution of accepted prices
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Figure 2: Payoffs for accepted price and best alternative price
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Figure 3: Estimates of discount rates without behavioral assumptions
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Figure 4:  Rational expectations reservation prices for alternative discount rates and
delivery dates.
Note:  The reservation prices for delivery now assume that the best available price for
delayed delivery is 100.  The reservation prices for delayed delivery assumes that the best
available price for immediate delivery is 100.
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Figure 5: Estimates of discount rates under rational expectations
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Figure 6a: Reservation prices for rational expectations and heuristic decision rules,
immediate delivery.
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Figure 6b: Reservation prices for rational expectations and heuristic decision rules,
delayed delivery.
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Note:  The discount rate is set to 0.5 in Figure 6b.  The rational expectations reservation
prices were calculated as described in the note to Figure 4.
igure 7: Fit of the classification model for the assigned heuristics
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Figure 8: Estimates of discount rates under the assigned heuristic
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Figure 9: Density of discount rates under alternative behavioral assumptions
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Note: This figure shows the distribution of discount rates estimated under three behavioral
assumptions. White bars: revealed preference without restrictions on behavior; tan bars:
heuristics assigned to each subject by our classification procedure; black bars: optimal
behavior. The total number of subjects is 68.
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